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Many people hold this truth to be self-evident, that there should be more female students in
science and engineering. We first examine four usual arguments: higher salaries, the possibility
to help others, the positive impact of diversity on designs, and the increasing need for engineers.
These indicate that there ought to be a mutual attraction between women and scientific fields, so
that there should be more women in these fields inasmuch as women are motivated to graduate
in science and engineering. Another common argument is that women are under-represented in
scientific fields. Yet under-representation is morally neutral and cannot by itself be a justification.
Focusing on ethics rather than statistics, we conclude that every woman should be allowed to
graduate in a field congruent with her abilities and desires. This is similar to the result of mutual
attraction. Outreach programs towards K–12 girls must therefore purport to allow them to choose
a field freely, rather than try to draw as many of them to scientific disciplines as possible. At the
very minimum, this will require an evaluation of the impact of outreach and a change of mindset.
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I. RAISING A HORSE FROM THE DEAD
The idea that there should be more female students in science and engineering and the consequent
policies are so important, are discussed so much, and can affect so deeply the lives of so many people
that one would expect them to have strong foundations. In fact, everyone is so convinced that asking
whether there should be more women in science and engineering would be beating a dead horse that
nobody checked that the horse was dead.
Precise arguments are unnecessary: there should be more female students in scientific fields “for a
variety of practical and moral reasons” (Felder et al., 1995). The closest authors get to presenting
arguments is naming them. They mention the name of an argument —rather than the argument
itself—, say that it has been widely used (probably implying that it must therefore be valid), and
move on. They for instance say “a lot of people argue for diversity in terms of fairness [ . . . ] but that’s
not my argument” (Wulf, 1998), “fairness is one answer, but certainly not the only one” (Gosink,
2001), or “aside from the obvious issues of access, fairness and equity” (Sullivan et al., 2003) without
ever actually making these arguments explicit. Yet, such words do not imply the existence (let alone
the validity) of arguments any more than dragons exist because the word ‘dragon’ does.
These authors would probably reply that these arguments do not really need to be made explicit
because they are obvious. It is also obvious that the sun revolves around the earth. Since what seems
obvious may turn out to be false, arguments have to be stated explicitly and convincingly rather
than glibly alluded to (this must be done at least once, then one can rely on what is from then on
a genuine argument without repeating the whole of it). When authors try to make their arguments
explicit (the exception rather than the rule) the result can be incoherent, e.g. “with the predicted
shortage of engineers by the year 2000, employers cannot be satisfied with anything less than the
very best engineers available” (Zywno et al., 1999). One must make sure that the arguments are
self-consistent, compatible with one another, and do entail what they are supposed to prove. This
requires to present them explicitly.
Several kinds of arguments are mentioned. Unfortunately, more arguments means a greater
probability that they be mutually exclusive. For instance, some argue that a greater female enrollment
in science and engineering is supposed to be good for the fields —but not necessarily for the women
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2themselves—, while others claim that female enrollment in science and engineering is a matter of
freedom of choice. While each of these arguments might justify a greater female enrollment, they
are obviously incompatible. As long as reasons are taken in isolation, they might seem convincing.
When they are considered together, on the other hand, one starts noticing such inconsistencies. Part
of the point of this article is to look under the rug, pick up mutually exclusive arguments and see to
what extent they can be reconciled. Like in movies where a man has several lovers it gets interesting
only when the lovers meet one another. Let us see if our incompatible arguments will plot a revenge
against the cheating idea that there should be more women in science and engineering.
II. MUTUAL ATTRACTION
A. Motivating science and engineering
As technology plays an ever-increasing role in society and economy, the number of engineering
graduates must increase and since females and minorities are under-represented they offer great
potential sources of engineers (Baum, 1990; Brainard & Carlin, 1998; Chen et al., 1996; Cuny &
Aspray, 2000; Moskal, 2000; Rockland et al., 2002; Sullivan et al., 2003; Wulf, 1998; Zywno et al.,
1999). Furthermore, more women in science and engineering would be good because of the greater
variety of designs which more diverse teams could invent (Cuny & Aspray, 2000; Gosink, 2001; Moskal,
2000; Wulf, 1998).
These arguments seem altruistic since women can contribute to the economy: “More compelling
arguments [than a higher income] have been raised that recognize the direct benefits that female
participation is likely to have upon these fields” (Moskal, 2000). But compelling for whom? These
arguments may efficiently motivate science and engineering to attract women, but this is not sufficient.
In essence, these arguments treat women as mere pawns to be transferred from one department to
another based on some external reason (e.g. the economy). Can one force somebody to do something
for the sake of others? According to (the second formulation of) Kant’s categorical imperative, this
is wrong because you should “act in such a way that you always treat humanity, whether in your
own person or in the person of any other, never simply as a means, but always at the same time
as an end” (Kant, 1785). To utilitarians, good means maximizing the happiness of the greatest
number (Bentham, 1789; Mill, 1871). If women do not want to become engineers, having more of
them in the field will decrease their happiness while increasing that of others only marginally.
These economic arguments achieve the great fit of getting to agree (against them) ethical views
which seldom do so: be it from a Kantian or a utilitarian viewpoint, these arguments must be rejected
if women do not want to study science and engineering, i.e. they are not valid justifications on their
own. That science and engineering should want to attract women does not imply that there has to
be more women in science and engineering. What women want is crucial.
B. Motivating women
“The compensation in science-related fields is often higher than that of other fields. By not
participating in science-related fields, women are barred from the economic rewards of these
fields.” (Moskal, 2000). Sullivan et al. (2003) make it clear early that engineering means money
by paying high school girls to attend a summer engineering workshop. However, if money were all
that matters, why would there be engineering schools at all, given that engineering professors could
earn more money in industry? Apparently, women do not pick a field trying to maximize their income
either: “clearly, if monetary incentives were enough, current starting salaries would have already fixed
the problem” (Wulf, 1998).
Studies show that women are more likely to stress interpersonal factors (e.g. helping others),
whereas men tend to value money and status more (Eccles, 1994; Morgan et al., 2001). Would
engineering allow women to help others? The president of the U. S. National Academy of Engineering
argues that engineering does have a positive impact on society and provides an opportunity to help
others (Wulf, 1998). Let us assume for the sake of argument that he is right. What does this argument
actually prove? It shows that women are wrong if they choose not to study engineering because they
believe that it will not allow them to help others. That is, such an argument shows that women
should want to major in engineering. Which does not imply that there has to be more women in
engineering.
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We must first notice that taken in isolation contributions to the economy, higher salaries, and
helping others all fail to justify anything. It is necessary that both women and the fields have an
interest in an increased female enrollment, i.e. it is necessary to invoke these arguments together.
Although having only one argument is not as satisfying as having four, it can be sufficient. But is
this argument really satisfactory?
Do women want to marry engineering? They do. Does engineering want to marry women? It does.
But what if they do not decide to have a relationship? One may be disappointed and one may try to
convince them that they are making a mistake. But one has no good reason to marry them against
their will (even if one is convinced that their will is mistaken). In essence, this justification by mutual
attraction tells us what to expect (‘there should be more women in science and engineering’ here
means that one would expect to find more women in these fields) but does not provide us with any
justification to make it happen if it does not spontaneously take place. One can only be a spectator,
perhaps an advisor but not a deus ex machina: one can try to show women that engineering would be
great for them but one must then let them make their own decision. Many will see this impossibility
to intervene as a shortcoming of this argument.
Since the needs of the economy and the possibility to help others are not universal, neither is the
win–win situation. For instance, it is doubtful that all engineers have a positive impact on society: do
weapons of war and buggy operating systems help others? Even if it is because of a small minority,
the claim that engineering has a positive impact on society collapses: only certain jobs would be
motivating, not any engineering job. Moreover, the need for engineers is not eternal (demand may
decrease due to recession, outsourcing, etc.) and engineers from all fields are not wanted everywhere
all the time. The question ‘should there be more women in engineering?’ is thus meaningless: there
are as many questions as fields, times, places, etc. Yes, there should be more women. But only in
some fields of engineering. Only at some times. Only in some places. You can justify all female
enrollment some of the time, and some female enrollment all the time, but you cannot justify all
female enrollment all the time. What looked like a justification for a greater female enrollment in
science and engineering is in fact career counseling.
D. Efficiency as an argument
For the sake of precision, we must point out that the argument by improved design is not quite
identical to that of the need for more engineers in that better designs may directly improve people’s
lives. Nevertheless, for this argument to have any strength, one must describe what the precise
benefits would be and in what women would bring them about — that a design is bad does not imply
that women would have necessarily done better. A general rule such as ‘on average, more feminine
teams create better designs’ may theoretically be induced from such examples beyond reasonable
doubt. But this requires more than a few isolated examples (and it requires to look for cases of better
designs by men, since these too should be taken into account in the average). Clearly, the positive
impact of women on designs has not been satisfactorily established so far (which does not mean that
the argument is intrinsically invalid).
One should notice that women are not the only ones who can contribute to diverse designs.
Foreigners (hired due to the lack of local engineers) undoubtedly bring new ideas, which can lead to
new designs. The low enrollment in engineering schools is therefore beneficial to society since it leads
to better designs. This is another example of incompatible arguments: if diversity is crucial then low
overall enrollment in scientific fields is a solution, not a problem.
Some argue that one needs more female engineers independently of what women want. Whether
this is correct or not, one must at the very least be consistent and apply the same rule to all possible
contributions to the economy. If child labor and child pornography can benefit the economy, should
they be legalized? Also, why not directly draft the best students to science and engineering instead
of allowing them to choose? In order to avoid these extreme consequences, one needs to provide
an argument which unconditionally shows that there should be more women in engineering without
endorsing child labor and child pornography. This path is at best narrow and it may not even exist.
In the absence of such a rebuttal, we must acknowledge that the interests of engineering cannot, in
themselves, unconditionally justify a greater female enrollment in the field.
4Any argument based on efficiency (what is good for the economy, what leads to better designs) may
have consequences abhorrent to its proponents, e.g. endorsement of child labor and child pornography.
There are several ways out of this problem. One may ignore the issue altogether; this is ever popular
yet not quite satisfying. One may stand by the premise of efficiency maximization and accept its
logical consequences; this is self-consistent but will never get wide approval. One may claim that
there exist particular cases; this indicates that the so-called argument was a mere rationalization for
what one believed a priori. Finally, one may look for an argument of a completely different nature,
which would not have the dreadful consequences of efficiency.
III. FAIRNESS
The argument by mutual attraction examined in the previous section turned out to be much weaker
than its proponents believe. However, not all hope is lost: there still are possible objective arguments
to consider, for instance fairness and diversity.
A. Diversity
The argument of diversity is widely used to justify a greater enrollment of minorities in universities:
“affirmative action policies are justified because they ensure the creation of the racially and ethnically
diverse student bodies essential to providing the best possible educational environment for students,
white and minority alike.” (Gurin et al., 2002) If students do not have a chance to come in contact
with minorities, they will have a more limited view on many intellectual and social subjects because
they miss a “wide exposure to the ideas and mores of students as diverse as this Nation of many
peoples” (Powell, 1978). However, this argument cannot be applied to the under-representation of
women since both sexes are typically present in one’s family and schools are generally coeducational:
although everybody one knows may be from the same social class, race, religion, etc. one has always
lived in a ‘sexually diverse’ environment (Correll, 2001). Increasing female enrollment would therefore
not have the same beneficial consequence as increasing minority enrollment.
B. A tautology?
Since diversity fails to justify an increase in female enrollment, we turn to fairness as a possible
justification. Typically, one just utters the word ‘fairness’ and expects everybody to bow. There
seems to be no need to clarify what one means by ‘fair’ nor in what a higher female enrollment would
be fair. Yet, the existence of rather idiosyncratic interpretations (e.g. to Moskal (2000) fair means
“economic rewards” — as in ‘a fair share of the booty’?) shows that the meaning of the word is not
self-evident.
Many people use ‘fair’ in a very loose way, as a synonym of ‘moral’ or ‘good’. In this case, it has
no precise meaning, just a vague positive value: ‘we should do what is fair’ then means ‘we should
do what is good’, i.e. ‘we should do what we should do’. This tautology is obviously of no help to
decide what we should concretely do.
C. The superiority of science and engineering
Another way to construe fairness is to say that science and engineering being superiorly good,
everybody should ‘have a piece of it’. This is true for instance of freedom, justice, education, etc.
Yet, this requires that these fields be indeed superior. Based on some criteria they may be, but then
one needs to show that these criteria are intrinsically superior to any other, with the risk of an infinite
regression. Moreover, most fields are probably convinced of their own superiority (like most religions
are convinced that they are the one true religion) and there is no reason to assume that science and
engineering are right and everybody else is wrong.
Sullivan et al. (2003) claim that “all citizens should be equipped with knowledge and experience
to make informed choices on issues involving technology.” One can also argue that foreign languages
are necessary on our small planet, legal knowledge is required in countries ruled by lawyers, etc. This
argument may justify enrollment in one engineering class, but should one really pursue a degree in
5engineering in order to equip oneself with the knowledge and the experience required to choose the
right MP3 player?
No demonstration of the superiority of scientific disciplines has been provided. The burden of
proof is on those who hold that fields are not equally acceptable career choices. Until such a proof
is provided, we must assume all fields equal.1 “We should not be sending these young women the
message that they are less worthy human beings, less valuable to our civilization, lazy or low in
status, if they choose to be teachers rather than mathematicians, journalists rather than physicists,
lawyers rather than engineers” (Kleinfeld, 1999).
D. ‘Is’ or ‘ought’?
As a matter of fact, “while women make up over 50% of the college-age population in the U.S.,
they represent a small minority among engineering students” (Chen et al., 1996). Yet, does it really
imply that it is “critically important that the causes for the low enrollment and high attrition rates
of female engineering students be identified and eliminated” (Chen et al., 1996)? This claim relies on
the simplest (and most common) of arguments based on under-representation: having no argument at
all (Anderson & Northwood, 2002; Baum, 1990; Brainard & Carlin, 1998; Chen et al., 1996; Morgan
et al., 2001; Sullivan et al., 2003; Zywno et al., 1999). (1) Women are under-represented. (2) Their
enrollment ought to be increased. (3) They are not under-represented any more. QED.
Yet, under-representation is of a statistical nature (lower proportion of women than in the overall
population), it is neither good nor bad per se. One may also notice that if under-representation were
wrong in itself then the under-representation of women in prison would imply that there should be
more female inmates. One cannot simply say that there are few women in science and engineering
and that there ought to be more without any explanation (saying that there are too few women
would already assume that there ought to be more). One cannot claim that “the numbers speak for
themselves, demonstrating a significant problem in recruiting and retaining women” (Baum, 1990).
All that numbers can demonstrate is that there are few women in scientific fields. Is this wrong?
Maybe. But numbers do not demonstrate that it is wrong, only that it is. As David Hume (1739–40)
pointed out, one must be very careful when trying to derive an ‘ought’ from an ‘is’. A link between
under-representation and unfairness must be provided explicitly.
E. Under-representation as unfairness
Under-representation taken in this crude statistical sense is obvious but irrelevant. Some, such
as Cuny & Aspray (2000), seem to vaguely see that the problem cannot be purely statistical as
“underrepresentation translates into a loss of opportunity for individuals” (my emphasis), yet do not
grasp the implications since they still aim for “an effort by all departments to increase the total
number of women.” For under-representation to be a valid argument, it indeed must be (re)defined
to be ethical, rather than statistical, in nature.
We use as reference a perfectly fair world, i.e. a world devoid of prejudice, discrimination, and
other biases. Women are then said to be under-represented if the level of female enrollment in the
actual world is lower than what it would be in a perfectly fair world. This new definition is less
straightforward than comparing enrollment to the proportion of women in the overall population but
it can link under-representation to unfairness, which the latter cannot do. In particular, it does not
justify an increase of the number of female inmates, which is obviously an improvement.
“In practice, equal opportunity is said to exist when people with similar abilities reach similar
results (equality of outcome) after doing a similar amount of work.” (wikipedia.org) In a perfectly
fair world, men and women would obviously have equal opportunities. What about the real world?
The low enrollment of females in science and engineering indicates that they do not reach similar
1 This is a second major difference compared to affirmative action (the first was that women cannot contribute to
diversity the way minorities do): while a college education and a college degree are better than no higher education,
science and engineering are not intrinsically superior to other fields. Due to these crucial differences, arguments in
favor or against affirmative action cannot a priori be assumed to apply equally well to the case of women in science
and engineering, and vice versa.
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women who want to study science are barred from the field, not if low enrollment springs from low
interest. We must therefore examine both the abilities and motivations of women compared to men.2
F. Sexual differences of abilities and occupational interests
Due to the greater variability of males compared to females, men are over-represented at the
top (Hedges & Nowell, 1995) and at the bottom of intellectual ability, e.g. twice as many boys as girls
have a learning disability and four times as many are dyslexic (Kleinfeld, 1998). Moreover, men and
women have different strengths: women typically have better verbal skills and men mathematical and
spatial abilities. Male superiority in spatial ability has also been observed in several mammals and
the favorable effect of testosterone is well documented (Browne, 2005).
Men and women do not differ only in terms of abilities, they also make different choices. On
Holland’s vocational interest test, women score higher on the “artistic” and “social” dimensions
and men on the “investigative” (relevant to math and natural sciences) and “realistic” (relevant to
engineering) dimensions (Kaufman & McLean, 1998). Part of the difference is biological: many sex-
differentiated behaviors appear at an early age when children are unable to identify sexes (Serbin et al.,
2001) and even babies exhibit differences (Connellan et al., 2000); moreover, sexual differences are not
limited to humans, e.g. young male and female monkeys are attracted to different toys (Alexander
& Hines, 2002). Part of the difference is due to socialization. Parents (Jacobs & Eccles, 1985)
and teachers (NSF, 1994) typically have lower expectations in math for girls compared to boys and
students themselves generally consider mathematics to be a masculine field (Hyde et al., 1990). When
males are generally believed to perform better at a given task, more lenient standards are used to
evaluate them (Foschi, 1996) and females tend to perform less well than when they do not expect a
sexual difference (Steele, 1997).
Both biology and society contribute to the low female enrollment in science and engineering. While
social biases would not exist in a perfectly fair world, biological differences would. Hence, all we can
safely conclude is that the fair level of enrollment is above the current figure (which is too low due to
social biases) but below 50% (innate differences prevent this). This seems anticlimactic. It is. Yet,
this is the only conclusion which data warrant. Any claim beyond this (e.g. that the fair level of
enrollment would be close to the current level or close to 50%) would be mere opinion, as it would
assume that one of the two contributions dominates.
G. Women are individuals
The crude statistical definition of under-representation, which uses the overall population as
reference, is a mere description: it carries no moral value and can therefore not be an argument.
We had to redefine under-representation in order to root it in ethics. This is an improvement but
does not suffice.
If all women studied science then obviously there would be no under-representation. However, this
would be far from ideal since it would require to force many women to study science against their will.
Indeed, under-representation —even redefined ethically— is intrinsically asymmetric: it can see when
there is too little but is blind to cases of too much. A symmetric criterion would say that women
should be neither barred from nor forced to the field. One can notice that this is not based on averages
but on individuals. In effect this means giving up the superfluous concept of under-representation
altogether. We will simply say that fairness exists when all women can graduate in a field congruent
with their abilities and desires. Satisfaction of this criterion will put an end to under-representation
but without the shortcomings of the latter.
2 Some argue that the important question is in fact not ‘why should there be more women in science and engineering?’
but rather ‘why are there few women in science and engineering?’. Yet, if one had the answer to the latter, one
would wonder what one should do based on this knowledge. In essence, one would ask if there should be more
women in science and engineering. Therefore ‘why are there few women in science and engineering?’ is of a secondary
importance and matters only inasmuch as it can shed some light on why there should be more women.
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Should there be more women in science and engineering? No. There should only be more women
in science and engineering who want to be in these fields. Once again, the proposed justification fails
to unconditionally prove that there should be more women in scientific fields. In fact, it proves that
there should not be more women in science and engineering in all cases.
In Sec. II, we concluded that the mutual attraction between women and scientific fields would work
only inasmuch as women are motivated to graduate in these fields. In the present section, we showed
that all women willing and able to study science and engineering should be allowed to and that others
should not be forced to. These two viewpoints —one based on efficiency and the other on fairness—
lead to surprisingly similar results. We can therefore be confident that our conclusion that every
woman should be allowed to graduate in a field congruent with her abilities and desires is robust.
One can note that this conclusion has never been explicitly derived so far. We did find a good reason
to increase female enrollment in science and engineering. But it applies only under precise conditions
and it required more thought than merely uttering ‘under-representation’ or ‘fairness’.3
IV. OUTREACH PROGRAMS AND FREEDOM OF CHOICE
A. The fair expectations
What does ‘should’ exactly mean in ‘there should be more women in science and engineering’?
Let us consider a simple analogy. We had two bottles of champagne and drank one, therefore there
should be one left. Here ‘should’ obviously has to do with a rational expectation based on the
circumstances: it would not be immoral if it turned out that no champagne was left, it would be
illogical. If expectation and reality clash, something must be wrong with the premise: maybe we
drank the second bottle or we had only one bottle to begin with. It would be silly to say that since
there should remain a bottle and none is to be found, we should go buy another one to solve the
problem. This would be solving the wrong problem.
Likewise, ‘based on fairness, there should be more women in science and engineering’ means that
one expected more women. Since there is a discrepancy between expectation and reality, something
must be wrong with the premise (fairness). Increasing female enrollment for its own sake would be
like buying another bottle to replace the missing one: it would solve the wrong problem. In other
words, the fact that there should be more women in science and engineering does not necessarily
imply that one should increase female enrollment. The only logical solution is thus to deal with the
unfairness directly. Policies aiming at increasing the number of women in science and engineering
typically include some form of outreach program towards K–12 girls. Acting early seems necessary,
but is it sufficient?
B. Kant on outreach
Zywno et al. (1999) found that 57% of the surveyed girls who had attended their summer camp and
were currently enrolled at a university were in engineering and 35% in other science-related fields. This
proves that outreach programs are wrong. At least Immanuel Kant would argue this way: according
to (the first formulation of) his categorical imperative, you should “act only according to that maxim
by which you can at the same time will that it would become a universal law” (Kant, 1785). If these
programs were a universal law, under 10% of women would major in non-scientific fields. This would
create an even greater disorder than the problem one meant to solve, as it would necessarily lead to
3 Some will probably claim that the arguments studied here are misrepresentations. This may be true. However, since
it is generally assumed that the reasons for an increased female enrollment are numerous, self-evident, compelling,
etc., asking the question explicitly is deemed unnecessary (or even wrong — politically incorrect). Consequently, it
is nearly impossible to find explicitly and clearly laid out justifications in the literature. For instance, is a greater
income a matter of fairness (Moskal, 2000) or of motivation (Wulf, 1998)? In order to evaluate the validity of these
arguments, we had to make them explicit and clarify them. This often required modification/mind-reading, which
may look like misrepresentation.
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numbers, i.e. on a dramatic ‘success’ of outreach. It would not apply if female enrollment increased
by 10% (even though this would be humongous). We must then turn to viewpoints which do not
require such a strong assumption.
C. The more the better
Measuring success in terms of number of participants who eventually enroll in science and
engineering de facto equates more with better. Calling outreach programs a “successful recruitment
strategy” (Zywno et al., 1999) when female enrollment is high or more generally seeing outreach as
‘recruitment’ (Anderson & Northwood, 2002; Baum, 1990; Brainard & Carlin, 1998; Cuny & Aspray,
2000; Gosink, 2001; Moskal, 2000; Rockland et al., 2002; Sullivan et al., 2003) clearly means that the
purpose is to get as many women as possible to scientific fields. Even when the rhetoric mentions a
free career choice, the actual goal is to increase enrollment numbers: Muller & Pavone (1997) talk of
“a commitment to increase the number of women pursuing their interests in science” (my emphasis)
yet measure success in terms of numbers (“percentage of women in Dartmouth’s graduating class who
were science majors rose from 12% to 25%. The proportion of women represented among engineering
majors rose to 25%.”)
The idea that more is better relies on the crude statistical concept of under-representation which
was dismissed in Sec. III. Using a more adequate criterion, we found only reasons to increase the
number of women enrolled in science and engineering who want to be in these fields. This is an
important theoretical improvement but it leads to a major practical problem: obviously, assessing
the match between a (possibly unexpressed) preference and a career is far more difficult than assessing
enrollment. Just as obviously, one should never set a goal just based on how easily success can be
evaluated.
D. Freedom of choice
In any case, one cannot cut corners and assume that in fact every girl unknowingly wants to become
an engineer ‘deep down’. One must keep in mind that the reason why outreach programs were created
in the first place was that the number of females in science and engineering was artificially low, due
to the impossibility for girls to freely choose a career in these fields. However, outreach programs
seem to lead to the opposite extreme: an impossibility for girls to freely choose against a career in
science or engineering.4 It would certainly be paradoxical to trample their right to a free choice in
order to enforce it. Sharing one’s love for science and engineering and trying to cancel out a negative
bias are very different from preaching the science gospel and actively converting girls. Manipulating
a girl towards science is not any more acceptable than manipulating her away from it.
Some insist that many outreach programs are voluntary. Yet, one cannot say that outreach is
justified because girls cannot choose freely and that outreach cannot be an issue because the girls
freely choose to attend. This is obviously inconsistent since it would require that girls be both free
and not free. Either girls can choose freely and outreach is pointless or girls are not free to choose
and outreach can indeed create a new servitude. In either case, outreach programs shortchange girls.
E. Giving up outreach?
One may agree that the importance given to numbers may theoretically drive outreach programs
to ‘recruit’ as many girls as possible, yet be skeptical that they actually do or ever will. In fact,
studies show that there is a correlation between feeling competent in a discipline and interest in this
4 Some argue that none of the authors cited actually argued that women should be forced into science and engineering.
Yet, none of the authors argued that women should not be forced into these disciplines either. Obviously, if they fail
to motivate or justify what they are doing they can always claim that they never made any invalid claim. We should
not give people credit for not providing any justification for what they are doing. One cannot both claim that one
is doing the right thing and refuse to say in what it is right.
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possible social biases mentioned in Sec. III.F by showing girls that they can be successful in science
and engineering. Outreach thereby tampers with the girls’ interests and (probably unconsciously)
manipulates girls towards scientific fields. By trying to delete social biases, these programs ipso facto
create a new bias. They do not free women, they merely change the nature of their servitude.
While a change of mindset (a ‘paradigm shift’) from increasing enrollment numbers to increasing
freedom of choice is both necessary and possible, it does not seem possible not to influence the girls
by increasing their feelings of competence (this is similar to quantum systems, where one cannot
read without writing). Should outreach programs stop right away then? Not necessarily. Although
flawed, they might still be better than doing nothing. In any case, it is necessary to evaluate their
negative effects and to reduce them so that benefits clearly outweigh risks on freedom of choice. How
to achieve this is not obvious. It is not even clear whether it is possible at all. What is clear is that
one cannot go on undisturbed on a path which appears to be the wrong one.
V. CONCLUSION
Many in science and engineering hold this truth to be self-evident, that there should be more women
in the field. We considered several commonly proposed justifications: higher salaries, the possibility
to help others, the increasing need for engineers, and the impact of diversity on new designs. When
made explicit and seriously scrutinized, they in fact show that there should be a mutual attraction
between women and scientific fields. This attraction is not universal so that there should be more
women in science and engineering only inasmuch as women actually want to graduate in these fields.
Disappointed by the weakness of this argument, we looked for a possible objective justification.
Many claim that women are under-represented in science and engineering and that, out of fairness,
their enrollment should be increased. Yet, under-representation is statistical in nature, it is neither
right nor wrong. We therefore redefined it to make it an ethical concept. Although an improvement,
this still had a shortcoming: its asymmetry. We finally settled on a criterion which did not mention
under-representation and simply states that all women should be allowed to graduate in a field
congruent with their abilities and desires. This conclusion is similar to that obtained from mutual
attraction.
Since freedom of choice sets a limit on the extent of the increase of the female enrollment in science
and engineering the goal of outreach programs must be clarified. Trying to allow women to choose a
field freely would be a moral dream but a practical nightmare, whereas drawing always more women
to science and engineering violates the right of the students to choose a career freely. Since outreach
programs cannot logically trample this right in order to enforce it, they need to make sure that their
advantages clearly overweigh their drawbacks.
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